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ABSTRACT PAGE

The implicit and explicit components of the human motivational system are typically considered
to be distinct but related, with varying implicit-explicit congruence across individuals. However,
prior research has only measured a particular type of individual congruence, which I term
normative congruence, individuals who are normatively congruent have similar levels of
explicit and implicit motivation as measured on a scale centered at the sample mean. I
propose two new ways to model congruence. First, temporal congruence can be modeled by
longitudinally measuring motives and examining the extent to which implicit and explicit
motivation covary across occasions. In this type of congruence, occasions are the units of
analysis. Second, configural congruence can be modeled by measuring motives in the
achievement, affiliation and power domains and measuring covariation across domains. In this
type of analysis, motive contents are the units of analysis. In two weekly-diary studies, I
measured well-being and all three types of congruence. Analyses indicated that temporal and
configural congruence were negatively related to each other. Normative congruence was not
consistently related to well-being, configural congruence was a highly robust predictor of
greater well-being, whereas temporal congruence was a moderately robust predictor of lower
well-being. Configural congruence may be beneficial because it entails having one’s identity
aligned with one’s strongest implicit motives, an alignment which drives the adoption of life
goals that one is motivated to pursue. Temporal congruence may be detrimental because it
predicts a lack of compensatory processes to maintain explicit goal pursuit on occasions when
implicit motivation lags. Thus, implicit-explicit congruence is not a unitary construct; there are
different types of congruence that have unique implications for well-being.
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Three Types of Motive Congruence: Normative, Configural and Temporal
The human motivational system comprises an implicit component and an explicit
component (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Spangler, 1992). The implicit
component is not accessible to the conscious mind and its contents must be elicited
through indirect means (McClelland et ah, 1989; Smith, 1992; Winter, 1973). The
explicit component is accessible to the conscious mind and its contents can be elicited
through verbal self-report instruments (McClelland, 1980; McClelland et ah, 1989). One
o f the enduring enigmas in research on these two systems is that implicit-explicit motive
congruence within individuals tends to be weak— most people have implicit motives that
only weakly correspond with their explicit motives (Thrash, Cassidy, Maruskin, & Elliot,
2010; Thrash, Maruskin, & Martin, 2012).
Compounding this enigma is the puzzling finding that motive congruence does
not have a consistent relationship with well-being (Thrash et al., 2012). Even though
theory on motivation predicts that people would experience greater subjective well-being
if their explicit pursuits were aligned with their implicit motives (because o f the
subsequent affective rewards) research has shown that for such well-being to ensue,
congruence is necessary but not always sufficient (Brunstein, 2010).
Although it is certainly possible that psychologists should amend their theory in
light of these two issues, I present another possibility in this thesis, namely that these two
issues arise from the problematic method o f measuring motive congruence in a particular
and arbitrary way, resulting in a type o f congruence that I hereafter call normative
congruence. This measurement technique entails measuring explicit and implicit motives
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across persons, and classifying an individual as congruent if he or she has similar
standing on both variables relative to others’ standing on these variables. As alternatives
to normative congruence, I propose two other forms o f congruence: temporal congruence
(covariation of implicit and explicit motives across time) and configural congruence
(similarity of implicit and explicit motive profiles across content domains). I present two
studies o f how the three types o f congruence are inter-related, and how each contributes
to the prediction of well-being.

Implicit and Explicit Motives
Motives represent inclinations to seek out certain types o f experiences, outcomes,
and rewards. Implicit motives orient, select and energize behavior by causing the
perceptual system to weigh opportunities and rewards based upon their alignment with
the motive in question (Schultheiss, Rosch, Rawolle, Kordin, & Graham, 2010). Such
motives arise from a system that primarily receives input and produces output non
verbally. It is appropriate that when two early motive researchers, David McClelland and
John Atkinson, first tested a variant o f the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan &
Murray, 1935) to measure implicit motives, the independent variable which they
manipulated was hunger. The manner in which hunger immediately operates— changing
the degree to which people seek, notice, and respond to food— is analogous to the way in
which implicit motives operate. Just as food provides immediate bodily satisfaction when
people are hungry, motive-correspondent goals provide an immediate affective reward
when they are reached.
Implicit motives also engender specific profiles o f threat sensitivity. If a goal is
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aligned with an aroused implicit motive, then threats and obstacles that impede progress
toward the goal are affectively potent, while unrelated threats and obstacles are less so
(Hall, Stanton, & Schultheiss, 2010).
There are a limited number o f implicit motives, and they are typically classified
into three domains: achievement, power, and affiliation. Individuals high in the implicit
need for achievement («Ach) strive to achieve exceptional performance or produce works
o f outstanding quality in their pursuits, especially in their chosen line o f work
(McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953; Pang, 2010). Individuals high in implicit
need for power («Pow) strive to attain positions in which can exert influence on the
greatest number o f people, while being subject to the influence o f the fewest number of
people (Winter, 1973; Fodor, 2010). Individuals high in implicit need for affiliation (wAff)
strive to create and maintain close, intimate relationships with people, and fear the
dissolution of these relationships (Heyns, Veroff, & Atkinson, 1958; Weinberger, Cotier,
& Fishman, 2010).
Although each o f these motives can be temporarily aroused in any person through
manipulation or deprivation, people who are consistently high in a single motive domain
are consistently sensitive to pertinent incentives. Consequently, implicit motives predict
major trends in one’s life trajectory, such as choice o f career, career success, and choice
o f romantic partner (Fodor, 2010; Winter, 1991; Winter, 2010). For instance, individuals
high in implicit nPow have been shown to choose careers in which they can deeply
influence others— they tend to become surgeons, psychotherapists, teachers, or pastors
(Winter, 2010).
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In contrast with implicit motives, explicit motives are measurable through
questionnaires and other verbal self-report instruments. In fact, the term explicit motive
came about in part because McClelland and others argued that when psychologists who
unwittingly tried to measure implicit motives using self-report instruments and obtained
reliable results by doing so, these psychologists were really measuring motives that arose
from a non-implicit system, one whose defining characteristic was its accessibility to the
verbal system (McClelland et al., 1989). Explicit motives are also typically classified as
belonging to the achievement domain, the power domain, or the affiliation domain.
Unlike implicit motives, explicit motives do not predict major life choices, and people do
not evince sensitivity at the neuronal level to incentives that correspond to explicit
motives. Explicit motives do, however, predict controlled and verbally framed forms of
behavior, such as responses to specific social expectations (McClelland et al., 1989),
particularly when verbally transmitted incentives are at stake (Spangler, 1992).

The Implicit-Explicit Correlation
In early motive research, the two types o f motivation were found to be
uncorrelated (see Thrash et al., 2012), but in later work the two types o f motivation were
found to be weakly related after corrections were applied for two primarily
methodological weaknesses. The first weakness was that the measures o f implicit and
explicit motives that were used did not correspond to one another in terms o f content.
When this flaw was corrected— when participants were evaluated with contentcorrespondent measures— people showed much higher congruence than what was
typically found otherwise (Thrash, Elliot, & Schultheiss, 2007).
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The second weakness was that measurement error hindered accurate calculation
o f congruence— unreliability in implicit measures became compounded with unreliability
in explicit measures. When measurement error was corrected by using latent factor
analysis (e.g. Thrash et al., 2010) or by dividing the correlation by the product o f the
measures' internal consistencies (e.g. Thrash et al., 2012), the implicit-explicit correlation
was significantly higher. A more detailed review o f these and other methodological
weaknesses in the history o f implicit-motive research can be found in Thrash et al. (2012).

Implicit-Explicit Congruence
The weak correlation between implicit and explicit motives in a given domain
implies that there are considerable individual differences in motive congruence— across
individuals there is variance in consistency between the levels o f implicit and explicit
motives. As traditionally defined, congruent individuals have similar levels o f implicit
and explicit motives within a given domain, whereas incongruent individuals have
dissimilar levels. I refer to this traditional operationalization o f congruence as normative
congruence, because it is the normative distributions o f scores on both variables that
determine whether an individual is congruent.
The most basic method of computing congruence scores has been to use z-score
differences. One can compute a difference score by subtracting the explicit motive zscore from the implicit motive z-score and taking the absolute value o f this difference
(e.g. Kehr, 2004). Individuals with low difference scores are considered congruent, and
those with high differences scores are considered incongruent. Thus, a person who is at
the sample mean for explicit motivation and also at the sample mean for implicit
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motivation is highly congruent, but a person who is at the sample mean for explicit
motivation and one standard deviation above the sample mean for implicit motivation is
somewhat incongruent.
Other ways have also been used to model congruence normatively. For instance,
some researchers have used polynomial regression with response surface analysis (e.g.
Kazen & Kuhl, 2011), or tested whether one motive moderates the effect o f the other (e.g.
Hofer, Chasiotis et al., 2006). If moderators are o f interest, another strategy is salient—
testing moderation of the implicit-explicit relationship using the cross-product
moderation test (e.g. Thrash & Elliot, 2002). What is consistent across all o f these
methods is that congruence is defined in terms o f whether one's relative standing on the
implicit motive is similar to one's relative standing on the explicit motive. It is assumed
that the study sample has an adequate range o f individuals, and that a metric based on this
range is appropriate for every individual in the sample.

Traits Related to Implicit-Explicit Congruence
The recognition o f considerable individual differences in motive congruence led
researchers to search for traits and other variables that moderate the implicit-explicit
motive relation. Several such moderators have been discovered in recent decades, and
Thrash et al. (2007) have argued that these moderators are catalysts for three different
processes: communication, integration, and resistance. The communicative factors may
open channels of information transmission between the two motivational systems,
leading to greater congruence. Two such factors that have received empirical support are
private body consciousness (Thrash et al., 2007), and referential competence (Schultheiss,
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Patalakh, Rawolle, Liening, & Maclnnes, 2011). Private body consciousness refers to
sensitivity to bodily states and changes, and referential competence refers to the ability to
quickly translate between non-verbal and verbal stimuli. If these processes are indeed
causes of greater congruence, it is plausible that physiological signals are being sent from
the implicit system to the explicit system, and the sensitivity o f the recipient system
moderates the signal’s impact. The integrative factors may unify the implicit and explicit
motivational systems. These factors include preference for consistency (Thrash et al.,
2007), identity status (Hofer, Busch, Chasiotis, & Kiessling, 2006) and self-determination
(Thrash & Elliot, 2002; Hofer et al., 2010). The factors pertaining to resistance help the
individual resist external pressure to change their explicit motives in directions that
diverge from their implicit motives. Self-monitoring, which refers to the monitoring of
others’ expectations and values, predicts the lack o f such resistance. Accordingly, low
self-monitoring predicts high congruence (Thrash et al., 2007).

Motive Congruence and Well-Being
One would expect a straightforward relationship between motive congruence and
subjective well-being. After all, a person who is highly congruent would more frequently
set the kinds of goals that provide potent affective rewards, thus reaping more o f those
affective rewards. Such a hypothesis would cohere with telic theories o f well-being,
which predict that satisfaction is the result o f goal-oriented striving and success (Diener,
1984; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). Such theories rely on the assumption that a
person’s affective states are tied to what a person is trying to achieve, whether a person is
achieving it, and whether a person is treating the achievement in question as a reference
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standard for success (Brunstein, 2010).
Some of the literature on motive congruence tends to show this positive, linear
association between congruence and well-being. For instance, two studies have shown
that incongruence predicts lower levels o f subjective well-being (Baumann et al., 2005;
Kehr, 2004). In another study, it was found that congruence predicted greater life
satisfaction, a finding which was replicated across three cultures (Hofer, Chasiotis, and
Campos, 2006). Others have found that a low-high discrepancy in the power domain—
one in which implicit strength was high and explicit strength was low— was predictive of
lower levels o f well-being and higher levels o f stress among managers, who are likely to
be high in implicit nPow (Kazen and Kuhl, 2011).
Consistency in such findings, however, has been lacking. At least one study has
shown a null relationship between congruence and well-being (McAuley, Bond, & Ng,
2004). Other studies have found a weak relationship or a moderated relationship. In the
study by Hofer and colleagues (2006) mentioned earlier, congruence in the power domain
predicted well-being, but congruence in the affiliation domain did not. In addition, the ill
effects of motive incongruence have been found to be ameliorated when a person uses
emotional disclosure as a coping strategy (Langan-Fox, Sankey, & Canty, 2009; Schuler,
Job, Frohlieh, & Brandstatter, 2008) and when a person is high in self-directedness or
internal locus of control (Langan-Fox et al., 2009). The beneficial effects o f motive
congruence have been found to be more evident when a person is engaging in goaldirected activity (Schuler et al., 2008) and when a person perceives progress (Brunstein,
2010). On one hand, such lack of consistency may explained by positing a more robust
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theory to explicate the relationship between congruence and well-being (Brunstein, 2010).
On the other hand, this problem suggests that congruence might need to be
operationalized in a more effective way.

Types of Congruence
My goal in the current paper is to examine three types o f congruence: normative,
temporal and configural. Normative congruence, as presented earlier, is a measure of
congruence that relies on the sample distribution as the reference standard for motive
measurement and congruence calculation, and it does not consistently predict well-being.
It also has other weaknesses as an individual-difference measure. First, a normativecongruence score inadequately handles the separation o f people in diagonally opposite
quadrants o f the data distribution. Those in the top right quadrant and the bottom left
quadrant are both congruent, but high-high congruence has different properties from
low -low congruence. Similarly, those in the top left quadrant and the bottom right
quadrant are both incongruent, but each type o f incongruence also has specific properties
(Langan-Fox & Canty, 2010). Thus, the use o f normative congruence also requires that
one have quadrant information or that one use response surface analysis. Although this
complexity is not necessarily a weakness— using the factor-and-quadrant approach to
classification may be theoretically optimal— it leaves room for a more parsimonious
single-factor approach.
Second, the calculation of normative congruence scores relies on the assumption
that the sample is representative o f the population at large. If one’s sample is drawn from
an undergraduate pool at a highly selective college, then the sample’s range o f scores on
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either the implicit or explicit achievement motive might be restricted to an abnormally
high range. Third, normative congruence is arbitrary because it treats the sample norm as
a valid reference point for everyone even though individual differences may necessitate
unique reference points for each individual. Given these weaknesses, it is worth
considering two other way of measuring congruence: configurally (across motive
domains) and temporally (across occasions) (Thrash et al., 2010).
Configural congruence is an indicator o f whether motive contents covary within
an individual as one moves from one domain to the next. Such congruence represents a
sensitivity to each domain’s strength and an apportioning of explicit motivation in a way
that corresponds to variation between domains at the implicit level. If a person is weak in
achievement, moderate in affiliation, and strong in power motivation at the implicit level,
then he or she will be configurally congruent if he or she is also proportionately weak in
achievement, moderate in affiliation, and strong in power motivation at the explicit level.
In simpler terms, a person who is configurally congruent has implicit-explicit profile
similarly. People who are more configurally congruent may have attained such
congruence by reaching a state o f identity achievement (Marcia, 1966), a developmental
state in which one is no longer exploring life options to find satisfaction, but rather has
settled on a trajectory that provides fulfillment.
Temporal congruence is an indicator o f how strongly a person’s explicit motives
(in particular domains) track his or her implicit motives (in corresponding domains)
across time. Such congruence represents a greater sensitivity to daily or weekly variations
in implicit-motive strength, such that each variation is communicated to the explicit
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system faithfully and quickly. Certainly, the communication may be in the opposite
direction— from the explicit system to the implicit system— but given the fundamental,
unconscious nature o f the implicit motive system, it is more plausible that signals travel
from the implicit system to the explicit system. Temporal congruence may vary across
persons due to attributes like trait mindfulness, because mindfulness engenders greater
sensitivity to implicit processes (Thrash et al., 2010).
The modeling o f configural congruence is similar in some respects to the
modeling o f two measures that pertain to Big Five trait profiles, namely profile stability
and within-time normativeness (see Furr, 2008; Klimstra, Luyckx, Hale, Goossens, &
Meeus, 2010). Profile stability refers to the within-person correspondence o f a person’s
trait profile from time 1 to time 2. Within-time normativeness refers to the similarity o f a
person’s trait profile at a given occasion to the normative profile (estimated from that
person’s peer group) on that occasion. These constructs bear some similarity to
configural congruence because configural congruence refers to the within-person
correspondence o f a person’s motive profile from the implicit level to the explicit level.
However, profile stability and within-time normativeness are calculated using qcorrelations (on the basis o f ranks), whereas configural congruence is calculated using
slopes (on the basis o f continuous scales). Rank-ordering could have used as the basis o f
configural-congruence derivation in the current study, but the way in which implicit
motives and explicit motives were measured allowed the use o f continuous measures,
which are more precise. Furthermore, within-time normativeness refers to person-group
congruence, where the group attribute, i.e. the group mean, is computed and fixed.
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However, configural congruence refers to implicit-self-explicit-self congruence, where
both the implicit attribute and the explicit attribute may vary across individuals.
The modeling o f temporal congruence is similar in some respects to the modeling
o f tracking accuracy in dyadic research (e.g. Overall, Fletcher, & Kenny, 2012). Tracking
accuracy refers to the precision with which actual temporal variation in person A is
perceived by person B. If such variation is tracked with consistency, then tracking
accuracy exists. However, such tracking accuracy is a measure o f temporal
correspondence between persons in a dyad, whereas temporal congruence is a measure of
temporal correspondence between motivational systems in a single individual.
Normative, configural and temporal congruence all represent correspondence
between implicit and explicit motives at the level o f individual differences, but they are
conceptually distinct and may be empirically distinct as well. Normative congruence
represents similarity between one’s explicit and implicit motives relative to the normative
distributions of both variables. Configural congruence represents similarity o f domain
profiles between one’s explicit system and one’s implicit system. Temporal congruence
represents the extent to which an individual’s implicit motive covaries with the
corresponding explicit motive across time.
My goal in measuring each type o f congruence in the current study is to compare
three ways o f thinking about individual differences in congruence and individual
differences in well-being. Although longitudinal data can also be used to measure withinperson variations in congruence, such variations are not the focus o f the current study.
Rather the goals of the current study are to measure the average congruence in each o f the
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three types, the distinctness of the three types, the between-person variation in each type,
and the association o f each type with levels and change in well-being. I am interested in
what it means to be a congruent person, and I aim to show that it can mean different
things, depending on which type of congruence one is talking about.

Hypotheses
First, I hypothesized that the three types of congruence are distinct. I expected the
correlations between the three types o f congruence to be low or moderate. Second, I
proposed a set of hypotheses concerning the relationship between each congruence and
well-being. I predicted that all three types o f congruence would positively predict well
being, but the nature of each relationship would be unique.
Normative congruence was expected to be a positive but weak or inconsistent
predictor o f well-being because o f its weak theoretical underpinnings and its dependence
on arbitrary distributions o f scores in particular samples. The current samples’are drawn
from college students at a competitive college, so the normative level o f explicit
achievement motivation scores in these samples will probably have a higher mean and
less variance than scores obtained from a general population sample, a limitation which
will constrain the validity of the sample’s normative-congruence scores in the
achievement domain. Similar problems may constrain the meaningfulness o f normative
congruence in other domains as well.
Configural congruence was expected to be a robust predictor o f well-being,
because a configurally congruent person tends to allocate a great amount o f explicit effort
to goals related to strong implicit needs, and a small amount o f explicit effort to goals
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related to weak implicit needs. Such congruence implies an attainment o f internal
correspondence between motive profiles, an attainment which predicts that larger life
goals, such as those pertaining to one’s education, career and family, will be set and
prioritized based on upon which goals provide dispositional affective rewards.
Temporal congruence was also expected to be a predictor o f well-being because a
temporally congruent person is aware o f the ebbs and flows o f his or her implicit motives,
and therefore tends to engage in pursuits on the occasions when those pursuits are most
affectively rewarding, and to drop those pursuits when they are less rewarding.
According to the hierarchical model o f motivation (Elliot & Church, 1997; Thrash &
Hurst, 2008), one could conceive o f a temporally congruent person as being energized by
his or her implicit motives, appropriately channeling such energy on the occasions when
it is available.
Although congruence of all three types is expected to be beneficial, there is a
duality to incongruence that must be noted. In some persons, incongruence may indicate
flexibility rather than dysfunction, because it could denote the regulatory ability to
cognitively focus on pursuing certain goals regardless o f implicit motivation levels, thus
increasing the likelihood of goal attainment (Kehr, 2004). The flexibility interpretation
may be most plausible in the case o f temporal congruence. At the temporal level, such
flexibility may be useful in the long run, because it causes one’s implicit and explicit
systems to aim at consistent goals in aggregate, even though implicit motivation may lag
r-

on certain occasions. Such consistency may derive from greater volitional strength, which
allows greater self-regulation when implicit motivation is weak (see Muraven &
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Baumeister, 2000).
In contrast, at the configural and normative levels, incongruence is more likely to
represent dysfunction than flexibility, because the individual's implicit and explicit
motives would be fundamentally divergent or chronically discrepant. These
considerations raise an alternative hypothesis regarding temporal congruence— that it is a
negative rather than positive predictor o f well-being.

Overview of Present Study
The current study used a weekly diary method to gather data from multiple
individuals at multiple time points regarding three motive domains. This design enabled
the operationalization of all three forms o f congruence, and the modeling o f both mean
well-being and growth in well-being. Any type o f congruence that predicts growth of
well-being over time can be considered a more robust correlate o f—and even a cause
of—greater well-being. Data were analyzed using latent curve growth models in order to
model both mean well-being and growth in well-being as dependent measures. Latent
curve growth models were more advantageous than lagged analyses because they entailed
the estimation of overall growth or decline in well-being rather than the aggregation of
separate instances o f growth in well-being without regard to overall trends.
The diary method was not only beneficial in gathering data at multiple time points,
but it also removed some o f the reactance and demand characteristics associated with the
laboratory. However, the collection o f data at multiple time points was primarily needed
to calculate temporal congruence accurately, and these data cannot sufficiently address
the question o f causality, which would require many more time points.
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Researchers in the hedonic tradition have posited that subjective well-being (SWB)
comprises not only positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) but also satisfaction
with life (SWLS) (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). Meanwhile, researchers in
the eudaimonic tradition have posited that well-being comprises variables that are related
to psychological flourishing, such as vitality and self-actualization (Ryan & Deci, 2001;
Ryff & Keyes, 1995). To measure these diverse forms o f well-being, I measured well
being in the present study with facets from both the hedonic tradition, which emphasizes
pleasure and satisfaction, and the eudaimonic tradition, which emphasizes optimal
functioning.

Method
Participants
Participants were undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology class,
who participated in this study to satisfy a research participation requirement.
In Sample 1, data were collected from 164 students. One participant’s data was
excluded for not completing the preliminary questionnaire. Five participants’ data were
excluded because they filled fewer than three weekly questionnaires on time. The final
sample comprised 159 participants, o f whom 39.8% were male. The age range of
participants was 18 to 23 years and the median age was 19.
In Sample 2, data were collected from 158 students. There were two cohorts o f
participants; the second cohort began the diary portion o f the study one week after the
first. One participant’s data was excluded because he or she completed fewer than three
weekly questionnaires on time. Seven participants’ data were excluded because their data
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appeared to be invalid. The final sample comprised 150 participants, o f whom 40% were
male. The age range of participants was 17 to 45 years, and the median age was 18.

Procedure
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. The experimenters collected
trait data from all participants using paper-and-pencil measures at the beginning o f the
study. The experimenters then informed participants that they would receive weekly
invitations to participate in an online study with a unique URL embedded in the invitation
email. Participants were told that these invitations would be sent out every Wednesday
with a deadline specified in the e-mail.
The experimenters then began the collection o f weekly diary-data collection over
an eight-week period, which began at the approximate midpoint o f an academic semester
and concluded one week before final examinations. The trait data were collected for other
purposes and will not be discussed here. For the weekly-diary portion o f the study,
participants received e-mail invitations each Wednesday and were requested to fill out an
electronic survey at a time o f their convenience between noon and 6 p.m. on that day.
The electronic surveys were administered with Opinio, a web-based data-collection tool.
On the basis of a previous diary study (Thrash & Elliot, 2003), 5:00 AM on Thursday
was treated as the natural cut-off point between Wednesday and Thursday. Thus, data
submitted after 5:00 AM were treated as late and excluded from analysis.

Measures
As recommended for diary studies (Nezlek, 2012), I used abbreviated measures.
The brevity of these measures reduced survey fatigue and promoted honest answering.
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The internal consistency for all diary measures was calculated by running an
unconditional analysis in a three-level hierarchical linear model with measurement items
at level one as recommended by Nezlek (2012) and Bryk and Raudenbush (1992), a
method which produces the functional equivalent o f Cronbach’s alpha (Nezlek, 2011).
The variables below were measured weekly.

Implicit motives. A modified version o f the Multi-Motive Grid (short version)
(MMG-S; Sokolowski, Schmalt, Langens, & Puca, 2000) was used to measure implicit
needs for achievement, affiliation, and power (see Appendix A). The MMG-S is an
implicit measure, derived from the Picture Story Exercise (PSE; Koestner & McClelland,
1992) and its predecessor, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & Murray,
1935). Like the PSE and TAT, the MMG-S comprises a series o f pictures o f one or more
persons engaged in an ambiguous activity, and it requires projective interpretation on the
part o f the participants. The MMG-S contains features o f implicit motive measures
(pictures) and features o f explicit measures (questions) but it is typically regarded as an
implicit measure (e.g. Kehr, 2004; Schuler et al., 2008). I used the MMG-S instead o f the
PSE because reliability and validity are likely to be compromised when the PSE is
repeated for several weeks. Such repetition o f the PSE leads to deliberate efforts to
modify one’s stories (Lundy, 1985; Winter & Stewart, 1977). In contrast the MMG-S has
high test-retest reliability (Schultheiss, Liening, & Schad, 2008).
Unlike the PSE and TAT, the MMG-S does not require participants to write a
freeform story about their interpretation o f each picture. Instead, participants are
instructed to put themselves in the position o f one o f the pictured persons, and are then
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presented with statements about how people in the picture might feel or think. These
statements are oriented toward the achievement, affiliation and power motives. Examples
of statements are “Feeling good about meeting other people,” “Trying to influence other
people”, and “Feeling good about one’s competency.” The MMG-S does not measure
intimacy motivation, a fourth domain (McAdams, 1989, 1992), whose similarity with
affiliation motivation has led to its conflation with affiliation motivation (Weinberger et
al., 2010). To be consistent with the tradition o f implicit motive research in the last
decade, I did not measure intimacy motivation in the current study.
In the original MMG-S, participants are presented with the options yes and no. To
measure variability more precisely, these options were expanded to a seven-point
numbered scale in the current study, where 1 indicated no and 7 indicated yes. Eleven
pictures from the original MMG-S were used and the total number o f statements was
trimmed from 72 to 49 so that participants would not be burdened with an exceptionally
long task, a burden which would have compromised validity. Specifically, most o f the
avoidance motive items and all filler items were deleted. The picture order was
randomized every week but the order o f statements beneath each pictures remained
consistent. I only scored statements pertaining to the approach aspect o f the motive,
because I only wanted to measure approach motivation.
The MMG-S involved assessing participants’ perceptions at the time the survey
was taken. In Sample 1, the internal consistency was .24 for achievement, .23 for power,
and .02 for affiliation. In Sample 2, the internal consistency was .09 for achievement, .16
for power, and .01 for affiliation. Such levels o f consistency are common in implicit
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measures of motivation (McClelland et al., 1953; Lowell, 1953; Schultheiss, Liening, &
Schad, 2008) because each picture exerts a different degree o f motive pull, and elicits
situation-specific motivation (e.g. education-related achievement, work-related
achievement), which is not consistent in strength across situations (Mischel & Shoda,
1995). Nevertheless, test-retest reliability and criterion validity are typically satisfactory
in the MMG (Schultheiss et al., 2008; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007). In Sample 1, the
median test-retest reliability based on pairs o f tests from consecutive weeks was .701 for
achievement, .766 for power, and .731 for affiliation. In Sample 2, it was .818 for
achievement, .831 for power, and .810 for affiliation.

Explicit motives. A measure of explicit motives was derived from a needsatisfaction measure created by Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, and Kasser (2001), which suited the
current study because o f its brevity and content validity (see Appendix B). The original
measure was created to confirm that events are felt as satisfying if they fulfill the three
needs postulated by self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985), namely
autonomy, competence' and relatedness. Two o f these needs are isomorphic with motive
domains: competence corresponds to achievement and relatedness to affiliation. The
original measure also measured the factor popularity-influence with three items, and
these items were used to measure explicit need for power in the current study.
The sentence stems were modified to assess motivations during the given week.
For instance, the statement “During this event I felt very capable in what I did” was
changed to “This week I have felt an impulse or desire to feel capable in what I do.”
Three items were included for each motive domain. Participants rated their agreement on
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a scale from 1 {not at all) to 5 {very much). For Sample 1, the internal consistency
was .42 for achievement, .32 for power, and .69 for affiliation. For Sample 2, the internal
consistency was .53 for achievement, .34 for power, and .66 for affiliation. In Sample 1,
the median test-retest reliability based on pairs o f tests from consecutive weeks was .543
for achievement, .594 for power, and .682 for affiliation. In Sample 2, it was .462 for
achievement, .616 for power, and .546 for affiliation.

Well-Being. All well-being measures made reference to how the participant was
thinking or feeling on that particular day.
Positive and negative affect. Positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) were
assessed with the 20-item Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; see Appendix C). The PA scale comprises 10 mood
adjectives such as enthusiastic and proud, and the NA scale comprises 10 adjectives such
as scared and hostile. Items were rated from 1 {very slightly or not at all) to 5 {extremely).
Evidence of the reliability and validity o f the PANAS scales can be found in Watson et al.
(1988). In Sample 1, the internal consistency was .79 for PA and .75 for NA. In Sample 2,
the internal consistency was .78 for PA and .74 for NA.
Satisfaction with life. Participants completed the 5-item Satisfaction with Life
Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985; see Appendix D). The SWLS measures life satisfaction
with statements such as “I am satisfied with my life.” These were rated from 1 {strongly
disagree) to 7 {strongly agree). Responses were summed to compute a life satisfaction
score. For reliability and validity o f the SWLS, see Pavot, Diener, Colvin, and Sandvik
(1991). Internal consistency was .43 for Sample 1 and .51 for Sample 2.
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Vitality. Participants completed the Subjective Vitality scale (Ryan & Fredrick,
2007), a 7-item scale with statements such as “I have energy and spirit” and “I am
looking forward to each new day” that were rated from 1 {not at all true) to 7 {very true)
(see Appendix E). After recoding a reversed item, a vitality score was computed by
summing across responses. For reliability and validity o f this measure, see Ryan and
Fredrick (1997). Internal consistency was .78 for Sample 1 and .79 for Sample 2.
Self-actualization. Participants completed a self-actualization scale by Sheldon et
al. (2001) (see Appendix F). This 3-item scale comprises statements such as “Today, I
feel a deeper understanding o f m yself and my place in the universe” that were rated from
1 {not at all) to 5 {very much). For evidence o f prior reliability and validity, see Sheldon
et al. (2001). Internal consistency was .69 for Sample 1 and .75 for Sample 2.

Computation of Normative, Configural, and Temporal Congruence Indexes
Based on the weekly data, I derived a normative-congruence score, a configuralcongruence score and a temporal-congruence score for each participant. For all variables
that were derived in the analyses below, I examined skewness and kurtosis. Data
transformations were applied as appropriate to reduce skewness and kurtosis to a range
between -2 and 2. In cases where data were standardized, all z scores below -3.29.and
above 3.29 were deemed outliers and modified to -3.29 and 3.29 respectively, after which
standardized scores were re-computed (see Tabachn'ick & Fidell, 2012).

Normative Congruence. To calculate the normative-congruence score, I first
aggregated all variables across time by computing individuals’ mean levels o f implicit
and explicit ftAch, rcPow, and wAff across eight weeks. I verified that I could reliably
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treat each w eek’s score as though it were a single item in an eight-item measure by
running an unconditional multilevel analysis, nesting weeks within persons, with the
weekly score as the dependent variable. The intraclass coefficients (ICC) in such analyses
indicate how much variance is at the between-person level. In sample 1, the ICCs in the
implicit motive measure were .59 for achievement, .67 for affiliation and .66 for power,
and in the explicit motive measure were .46 for achievement, .56 for affiliation, and .51
for power. In sample 2, the ICCs in the implicit motive measure were .59 for
achievement, .65 for affiliation and .66 for power, and in the explicit motive measure
were .44 for achievement, .52 for affiliation, and .57 for power. Thus, with the exception
o f explicit rcAch, all ICCs indicated that there was greater variance at the between-person
level than the within-person level, implying that aggregate means were moderately
reliable as dispositional measures.
The aggregate means were converted to z scores, and the implicit-motive z score
was subtracted from the explicit-motive z score to derive discrepancy scores. These three
discrepancy scores were converted into absolute values, and the average o f the three
scores was computed. It was then reflected, so that it would indicate congruence rather
than incongruence. This procedure produced a raw normative-congruence score.

Configural Congruence. To calculate the configural-congruence score, the
aggregate score o f implicit motive strength and explicit motive strength per participant
was once again derived by taking the average across weeks o f scores on the implicitmotive and the explicit-motive measure. To create a level-one file for a multilevel model
o f domains nested within person, each case was then separated into three cases based on
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the three domains. Thus each person was represented by three cases in the data file, one
case per domain. Each of these cases had a variable for the person’s implicit-motive score
in a specific domain and the person’s explicit-motive score from the same domain. Using
this table of motives as level-one o f a two-level hierarchical data structure, I conducted a
multilevel analysis, nesting motives within persons, with the following model:
Motive-domain Level (level 1):
Explicitti = 7toi + 7ti j(Implicitti) +

e tj

Person Level (level 2)

ftoi = Poo + roi
n ii = P io + rn
Explicitti is the explicit-motive score o f person i in domain t and Implicitti is the
implicit-motive score o f person i in domain t. The explicit motive was used as the
dependent variable because motivational theory suggests that the direction o f causality is
from implicit motives to explicit motives (Thrash et al., 2010). The implicit-motive score
was entered group-mean centered at level 1. From this analysis, a residual file was
generated, from which the estimated slope coefficient (7tij) for each participant was
extracted. Because the slopes were allowed to vary randomly at level 2, this slope was
unique for each participant, and represented the degree to which that participant was
congruent across domains. This was the participant’s raw configural-congruence score.

Temporal Congruence. To calculate a temporal-congruence score, I conducted a
multilevel analysis for each domain, nesting weeks within persons, with the following
model:
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Week Level (level 1):
Explicittj= 7toi + 7ti j(Implicitti) +

e tj

Person Level (level 2):

TCoi = Poo + roi
^i i = Pi o + rii

Explicitti is the explicit-motive score o f person i in week t and Implicitti is the
implicit-motive score of person i in week t. The implicit motive was entered group-mean
centered at level 1. From this analysis, I generated a residual file, from which I extracted
the estimated slope (nu) for each participant. Because the slopes were allowed to vary
randomly at level 2, this slope was unique for each participant, and represented the
degree to which a participant’s explicit motive accurately tracked his or her implicit
motive across time. I then repeated this analysis for the affiliation domain and the power
domain. I then averaged a participant’s slope across all three domains to derive that
participant’s raw temporal-congruence score.

Score Standardization. Because configural and longitudinal congruence scores
were derived in a similar fashion, a single-unit difference in configural-congruence scores
was comparable to a single-unit difference in temporal-congruence scores. However,
normative-congruence scores were computed using a different method, making a single
unit difference in normative-congruence scores mean something different from a single
unit difference in the other two types. Raw scores on all three types o f congruence were
therefore standardized. After standardization, a single-unit difference on any type of
score consistently indicated a difference o f one standard deviation.
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Results
Mean Levels and Inter-Correlations of the Three Congruence Types
Based on the z-score model and the two hierarchical linear models described
above, I begin by reporting the mean levels o f normative, configural and temporal
congruence, because these mean levels indicate whether people were congruent or
incongruent on average in each type o f congruence. For normative congruence, the mean
discrepancy score (unreflected and unstandardized) was significantly different from zero
in Sample 1, ^(149) = 23.458,/? < .001, and Sample 2, r ( l59) = 23.981 ,/? < .001. The
minimum discrepancy scores in Samples 1 and 2 were . 15 and . 17 respectively, which
indicates that some participants were highly congruent, although no participant reached
the perfect congruence score o f 0. The maximum discrepancy scores in Samples 1 and 2
were 2.87 and 2.97 respectively, which indicates that some participants were highly
incongruent, although no participants reached the outer bound o f approximately 6.58,
which is the greatest possible discrepancy score given a z-score range o f -3.29 to 3.29.
These results are unsurprising, and they replicate what previous studies have found. Note
that these discrepancy scores were reflected and standardized to derive the normativecongruence scores which were used in further analyses.
For configural congruence, the average relationship between explicit motive and
implicit motives across domains was negative (Sample 1: Pio = -0.092, t = -4.139,/?
< .001; Sample 2: Pio = -.160, t = -9.072, p < .001), indicating that the average participant
was configurally incongruent. His. or her explicit-motive configuration was significantly
negatively correlated with his or her implicit-motive configuration. Thus, the typical
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configural condition is one o f opposition in ranking and proportionality between one’s
explicit motive profile and one’s implicit motive profile.
For temporal congruence, implicit and explicit motives tended to vary positively
across time in all three domains: the achievement domain (Sample 1: Pio =.061, t = 5.24,
p < .001; Sample 2: Pio = .046, t= 3.23,p = .002), the affiliation domain (Sample 1: Pio =
0.061, t = 5.42,/? < .001; Sample 2: pio = .026, t = 2.18,/? = .031), and the power domain
(Sample 1: Pio = 0.046, t = 4.32,/? < .001; Sample 2: pio = .045, t = 3 A l , p < .001). These
results indicate that for the average participant, explicit motives accurately tracked
implicit motives across time.
Inter-correlations between the types o f congruence were then computed to
determine the distinctness o f each type. The three types o f congruence were only weakly
inter-correlated, and some of these correlations were negative. Configural congruence
was negatively related to temporal congruence in both sample 1 (r = -.36, p < .001) and
sample 2 (r = -.28,/? < .001). Configural congruence was positively related to normative
congruence in sample 1 (r = .20, p = .014) and marginally so in sample 2 as well (r = .14,
p = .093).

Latent Growth Curve Analyses of Well-Being
A latent growth curve model was used to examine whether the three types of
congruence predicted mean well-being and temporal growth in well-being. Data were
examined using version 19 o f IBM SPSS Amos. Latent growth curve models account for
variations in missing data by giving added weight to data from participants who
completed a greater number o f valid submissions. Two sets o f latent-curve models were

THREE TYPES OF MOTIVE CONGRUENCE

29

run, one in which the three congruence indexes were correlated with the well-being mean
and slope latent variables, and another in which the three congruence variables were
modeled as simultaneous predictors o f those latent variables. The first set provided
correlations between each congruence type and each measure o f well-being. The second
set provided standardized path coefficients that indicated the unique contribution o f each
congruence type to the prediction o f well-being. The second set o f analyses was run to
determine whether each type o f congruence made a significant contribution after the
other types were controlled for.
Figure 1 illustrates the model used for the first set o f analyses. Positive affect is
the dependent variable in the figure, but this template was used for all five measures o f
well-being. The model estimates positive affect scores on particular weeks as a linear
function of a mean (M) latent variable, a slope (S) latent variable, and a uniqueness (error)
term. Weekly measurements of positive affect are indicated by the w lp a through w8pa
variables. Whereas a standard growth curve model has loadings o f 1,1,1... 1 on an
intercept factor and loadings of 0... 1 on a slope factor, this model has loadings that are
centered at 0 so as to estimate means instead o f initial values. The double-headed arrows
denote that the coefficients represent first-order correlations. Figure 2 illustrates the
model used for the second set o f analyses, in which the predictors were entered
simultaneously, as in a multiple regression model. The single-headed arrows indicate this
difference. The disturbance terms d l and d2 indicate variance that is not meaningful for
the estimation o f the mean and slope.
The results o f the first and second sets o f analyses for PA, NA, satisfaction with
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life, vitality, and self-actualization are reported in Table 1. In sample 2, positive affect
and vitality had no variance in their slopes; the slope latent variables were trimmed in
these two cases. Fit indices are reported in Table 2. The fit was adequate or good for all
variables except NA, where it was only somewhat satisfactory.
Normative congruence inconsistently predicted mean well-being across the two
samples, both in terms o f correlations and standardized path coefficients. In sample 1, it
was positively correlated with mean PA, SWLS, vitality and self-actualization, which
accords with previous research, and all o f these relationships were statistically significant.
But in sample 2, its relationship with well-being was non-significant, except for one case
o f marginal significance, where it predicted mean self-actualization. It did not predict
well-being slope in either study.
Configural congruence consistently predicted greater well-being in both samples
both in terms o f correlations and standardized path coefficients. It was a uniquely robust
predictor o f mean PA,-SWLS, Vitality and self-actualization, reaching a significance
level of less than .001 in all o f these cases. In sample 1, it also predicted the slopes o f PA,
SWLS, vitality and self-actualization, and in sample 2 it predicted the slope o f selfactualization, but not SWLS. (Due to insufficient variance, its relationship with PA slope
and vitality slope could not be modeled in sample 2).The only unexpected finding
pertaining to configural congruence was that it positively predicted NA slope in one
sample, but this result was only marginally significant. Moreover, this unusual finding
was not found in sample 1, and it is likely a random occurrence.
Temporal congruence consistently predicted lower well-being across both
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samples in terms o f correlations and standardized path coefficients. It predicted all
indicators of well-being in the negative direction in sample 1, and this pattern o f findings
was replicated in sample 2, but some coefficients did not reach significance in the latter
case. Uniquely among the congruence types, it positively and robustly predicted NA; it
also negatively predicted the four measures o f positive well-being. Although robust in
sample 1, these findings were weak in sample 2, with four o f the five coefficients
reaching only marginal levels of significance. However, the pattern o f temporalcongruence findings across both samples was identical with regard to the mean, and
temporal congruence was a predictor o f NA slope in sample 2 as well. The only
discordant finding regarding temporal congruence was that it was weakly related to
positive growth in SWLS in sample 2— but this finding was marginally significant and
likely a coincidence.
In summary, normative congruence was inconsistent across the two samples,
evincing a significant association with well-being only in sample 1. In contrast,
configural congruence was strongly associated with greater average well-being and
greater well-being growth in both samples, while temporal congruence was moderately
associated with lower average well-being and— in one sample— with well-being decline.

Discussion
The three types o f congruence were distinct from one another, they had different
average levels among participants, and they played different roles in predicting well
being. None o f the types o f congruence was highly correlated with any other type o f
congruence, and this distinctness suggests that there is little justification for researchers
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to continue focusing on normative congruence. Indeed, normative congruence may be the
least useful type, given that its relationship with well-being was inconsistent across
samples. Researchers may benefit instead from focusing on configural congruence in
cross-sectional studies, and both configural and temporal congruence in longitudinal
studies.

Types of Congruence as Predictors of Well-Being
All three types o f congruence were predictors o f mean well-being to some degree,
but, in accordance with prior research, findings regarding normative well-being were
inconsistent— in sample 1, it was positively related to well-being, but in sample 2 it had a
null relationship with well-being. As noted earlier, the method for computing normative
congruence has weaknesses which make it arbitrary and unreliable, evident in the varying
coefficients pertaining to normative congruence across both samples in the current study.
In contrast, the positive role o f configural congruence and the negative role o f temporal
congruence were strikingly consistent.
Configural congruence had the most robust association with average well-being
and growth in well-being. This association is consistent with the fact that configurally
congruent persons have prioritized their explicit motives such that they are directing their
greatest explicit motivational volition in accordance with their strongest dispositional
implicit motive. The precision with which configural congruence predicts well-being may
arise from the fact that configural congruence ignores information about one’s
cumulative amount o f motivation. Some people may have less cumulative energy at the
explicit level than average, and will therefore be low in normative congruence. However,
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this explicit energy may be apportioned in accord with their implicit profiles, which
would cause the highest amount o f energy to be devoted to pursuits that correspond to the
most compelling implicit needs. Because configural congruence captures this type of
implicit-explicit correspondence while disregarding information about how much
cumulative energy one has, it follows that configural congruence was a robust predictor
o f well-being. Given that configural congruence not only predicted well-being means but
well-being slopes, our findings suggest that configural congruence was not merely a
correlate, but also a cause of greater well-being.
Temporal congruence, in contrast, was a negative predictor o f well-being. One
reason for this contrast could be that temporal congruence does not represent sensitivity
to need means but rather sensitivity to need variations, which are not the same thing. An
aggregate sensitivity to need means is more likely to predict an implicit-explicit
alignment, but sensitivity to need variation is merely likely to predict that everyday
decisions will reflect the relative strength o f the corresponding motive at the time the
decision is made. Because major life choices have a greater impact than everyday
decisions, it follows that temporal congruence did not positively predict well-being.
Temporal congruence may represent a maladaptive form o f goal seeking in which
one pays too much attention to goals in the local time frame and too little attention to
goals in the global time frame. It may also represent an inefficient, unproductive
diffusion of effort, given that time is being managed not strategically but impulsively.
Such a diffusion of effort would predict goal-related failures, which would accord with
the finding that temporal congruence alone predicted greater NA.

THREE TYPES OF MOTIVE CONGRUENCE

34

Configural Congruence vs. Temporal Congruence
Why did configural congruence starkly contrast with temporal congruence as a
predictor o f well-being? And why was configural congruence negatively correlated with
temporal congruence? There are five possibilities to consider. First, people who are high
in configural congruence may achieve goals more efficiently because they exert more
sustained effort to achieve goals, whereas people who are high in temporal congruence
only exert effort on occasions when they are implicitly motivated. Thus, cognitive self
management may help people who are high in configural congruence achieve their goals
with greater efficiency and a higher rate o f success.
Second, configural congruence and temporal congruence may arise through
different psychological mediators. Theoretically, people who are configurally congruent
have achieved the correct prioritization o f their explicit goals such that they realize which
explicit goals deserve the most attention. They may then commit to these explicit goals
and strive to maintain steadiness in their goal pursuit even on the occasions when their
implicit motive lags. Thus, they are likely to be higher in identity achievement and low in
identity moratorium (Marcia, 1966), two factors which are plausible mediators between
configural congruence and well-being. In contrast, people who are temporally congruent
have the ability to notice fluctuations in implicit motive strength, an ability that may arise
through mediational processes associated with mindfulness and private body
consciousness. Although there is no theoretical basis for considering the first set o f
mediators (identity achievement and identity moratorium) to be opposed to the second set
o f mediators (mindfulness and private body consciousness), it is possible that if both sets
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are operative, people who are high in identity achievement may not attend to the
information they receive through mindfulness and private body consciousness, because
they are cognitively focused on goals that outweigh temporarily arising needs. In contrast,
people who are high in identity moratorium are constantly exploring alternatives, and
greater awareness o f temporarily arising needs may aggravate this exploratory tendency
I
to an unhealthy degree.
Third, because temporal and configural congruence are independent, a large
degree o f temporal congruence cannot help individuals solve configural problems. In fact,
temporal congruence maintains implicit-explicit relationships across tim e,\o if a person
has configural problems, those problems could be sustained by temporal congruence. In
Figure 3 , 1 have illustrated this effect by showing the time series o f three hypothetical
persons who differ from one another in their level o f configural congruence

ir temporal

congruence. This diagram at the top shows how a configural discrepancy canljDe
j
maintained by high temporal congruence. In this person’s first motive domain] the
explicit motive accurately tracks the implicit motive— rising in the same propirtion
across weeks— and in the second and third domains, motivation is stable. But Ehis person
never attains configural congruence because he or she was incongruent at the outset.
. ,

1

Fourth, people who are high in temporal congruence may not only be ssnsitive to
need variation, but they may also arrive at a meta-awareness o f their sensitivity to need
variation. Thus, they may perceive themselves as having unstable identities, a sdf»i

perception that predicts lower well-being even on occasions when the perceivtfi changes
are positive (Keyes, 2000; Keyes & Ryff, 2000).
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Fifth, the critical difference between configural congruence and temporal
congruence could be their different average levels. The average level o f configural
congruence was negative in both samples, indicating that the baseline configural state
was one in which congruence had yet to be achieved. Participants with higher configuralcongruence scores had transcended this baseline state— possibly reaching the state of
identity achievement— and were thus more likely than the remainder o f the sample to
experience greater well-being. The average level o f temporal congruence, however, was
positive in both samples. Thus, the baseline temporal state was one in which a moderate
degree o f temporal congruence had already been attained. Participants with higher
■; temporal-congruence scores had not attained anything that the average participant was
lacking.
Thus, temporal congruence may not be a desirable form o f congruence, but rather
a problematic lack o f the flexibility one needs in daily life, where it is sometimes
necessary to expend volitional energy in order to maintain explicit motivation levels.
People who are high in temporal congruence may lack such volitional energy because
they lack the kind o f goal commitment that arises from the attainment o f configural
congruence, a hypothesis which accords with the fact that configural and temporal
congruence are negative correlated.

Limitations and Conclusion
Because the current study was an eight-week longitudinal study, each participant
gave us data at eight (or fewer) time points about their explicit and implicit motives.
Measurement on multiple occasions allowed the computation o f an aggregate score on
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each implicit and explicit motive that was more reliable than a datum from a single
occasion. Such reliability enhanced the precision o f the normative- and configuralcongruence scores, but it did not enhance temporal-congruence scores; for temporalcongruence scores, the computation relied on only one datum per week. Thus, one
limitation o f our study is that temporal congruence was measured less reliably than
normative and configural congruence, a limitation that is inherent to the construct of
temporal congruence.
Another limitation o f this study is that motivation was measured in only three
domains, a restriction which decreased the reliability o f configural congruence
measurement. However, the use o f these three domains accords with prior research in the
field, an accordance which was particularly important given that our aim was to be
methodologically corrective. The use o f three domains was also limiting because each
domain encompassed several facets that are undifferentiated in such a broad, tripartite
classification schema. Thus, the inclusion o f more domains would have increased
precision.
Because prior research on motive congruence has relied on the normative
measurement model, our findings suggest that a correction is needed in the accepted
methodology for measuring congruence. Specifically, configural congruence, which
proved to be much more robust, may be the ideal type o f congruence to measure, not only
for the prediction o f well-being, but also for research into moderators o f individual
differences in congruence. In addition, future researchers would benefit from measuring
temporal congruence— its association with poor well-being suggests that it may be a

THREE TYPES OF MOTIVE CONGRUENCE

38

dispositional causal factor as well.
Normative congruence, itself a normative method in past research, appropriately
served as a norm against which two new forms of congruence could be compared and
contrasted. The resulting contrasts point out that any method itself can serve as a metric
against which new methods can be compared and contrasted. The results are also a
reminder that a statistical model, once widely adopted, can lead to the persistent
measurement of just one facet of a larger construct across several decades o f research.
The introduction of new models can shed light on the limitations o f the former model,
and not only drive statistical progress but also conceptual progress by revealing the
construct’s other facets.
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Table 2
Fit Indicators fo r Growth Curve Model Analyses
Chi-square

df

TLI

CFI

RMSEA

Sample 1
PA

77.71

56

0.95

0.96

0.049

NA

116.31

56

0.85

0.87

0.082

SWLS

141.62

56

0.93

0.94

0.098

Vitality

59.07

56

0.99

0.99

0.019

126.30

56

0.89

0.91

0.089

PA

81.69

62

0.86

0.97

0.046

NA

98.85

56

0.87

0.89

0.071

SWLS

104.28

56

0.95

0.96

0.076

Vitality

98.03

62

0.93

0.93

0.063

120.87

56

0.92

0.93

0.088

Self-actualization
ample 2

Self-actualization
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Normative
Congruence

Temporal
Congruence

Figure 1. Model Used for Latent Growth Curve Analysis with Correlations. W lpa
through W8pa denote weekly measures o f positive affect. The weightings o f the paths
from the slope from -3.5 to 3.5 are to make the intercept represent the person mean..
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Configure!
Congruence

Figure 2. Model Used for Latent Growth Curve Analysis with Standardized Path
Coefficients. W lp a through W 8pa denote weekly measures o f positive affect. The
weightings o f the paths from the slope from -3.5 to 3.5 are to make the intercept represent
the person mean.
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Figure 3. Hypothetical time-series o f three persons with varying levels o f temporal and
configural congruence. Numbers on the X-axis indicate the three motive domains. Black
and white bars represent implicit and explicit motives respectively.
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Appendix A
Trimmed Version o f Multi-Motive Grid (Short)(MMG-S; Sokolowski et al. 2000)
Note: Options below each statement were presented on a seven-point numbered scale
from 1 (no) to 7 (yes).
On the following pages, you will see a set o f pictures depicting all kinds o f everyday
situations. We did not choose very clear and detailed pictures because we want you to use
your imagination in guessing what might be going on in these pictures. Please try to put
yourself in the position o f one o f the persons who are shown in these pictures. Below
these pictures, you will also find a set o f statements describing the way people could
think and feel in this situation. Please decide for each statement how well it describes this
situation, and indicate your response by choosing a number from 1 (NO) to 7 (YES).
Please do not think about a single statement too long and try to follow your spontaneous
impression.

1. Feeling good about meeting other people
2. Being afraid of being overpowered by other people
3. Hoping to get in touch with other people

THREE TYPES OF MOTIVE CONGRUENCE

1. Feeling good about meeting other people
2. Anticipating to lose standing
3. Wanting to postpone a difficult task for a while
4. Hoping to get in touch with other people

1.
2.
3.
4.

Feeling confident to succeed at this task
Being afraid of being rejected by others
Feeling good about one’s competency
Wanting to postpone a difficult task for a while
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1. Feeling good about meeting other people
2. Thinking about lacking abilities at this task
3. Being afraid o f being overpowered by other people
4. Hoping to get in touch with other people

1. Feeling confident to succeed at this task
2. Being afraid o f being rejected by others
3. Feeling good about one’s competency
4. Being afraid o f being boring to others
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1. Feeling confident to succeed at this task
2. Thinking about lacking abilities at this task
3. Feeling good about one’s competency
4. Trying to influence other people
5. Hoping to acquire a good standing

1. Feeling good about meeting other people
2.
3.
4.
5.

Feeling confident to succeed at this task
Feeling good about one’s competency
Being afraid o f being boring to others
Trying to influence other people

6. Hoping to get in touch with other people
7. Hoping to acquire a good standing
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1. Feeling confident to succeed at this task
2.
3.
4.
5.

Being afraid of being rejected by others
Feeling good about one’s competency
Trying to influence other people
Hoping to acquire a good standing

1. Feeling good about meeting other people
2. Trying to influence other people
3. Hoping to get in touch with other people
4. Hoping to acquire a good standing
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Feeling confident to succeed at this task
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task
Feeling good about one’s competency
Trying to influence other people
Hoping to acquire a good standing

1.
2.
3.
4.

Feeling good about meeting other people
Trying to influence other people
Hoping to get in touch with other people
Hoping to acquire a good standing
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Appendix B
Measure o f Explicit Motives (derived from Sheldon et al., 2001)
Note: Options below each item were presented on a five-point numbered scale from 1
{not at all) to 5 {very much).
This week, I have felt an impulse or desire to:
1. successfully complete difficult tasks and projects
2. have a sense o f contact with people who care for me, and whom I care for
3. be a person whose advice others seek out and follow
4. take on and master hard challenges
5. be close and connected with other people who are important to me
6. strongly influence others' beliefs and behavior
7. be capable in what I do
8. have a strong sense of intimacy with the people Ispend time with
9.

have strong impact on what other people do

THREE TYPES OF MOTIVE CONGRUENCE

60

Appendix C
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988)
Note: Options below each item were presented on a five-point scale with these five
anchors: very slightly or not at all, a little, moderately, quite a bit, extremely.
This scale consists o f a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.
Read each item and then indicate to what extent you feel this way today.
Today. I-feel...
1. interested
2. distressed
3. excited
4. upset
5. strong
6. guilty
7. scared
8. hostile
9. enthusiastic
10. proud
11. irritable
12. alert
13. ashamed
14. inspired
15. nervous
16. determined
17. attentive
18. jittery
19. active
20. afraid
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Appendix D
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985)
Note: Options below each statement were presented on a seven-point numbered scale
from 1 {strongly disagree) to 7 {strongly agree).
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each o f the following statements
regarding how you feel today.
Today. I feel that...
1. In most ways, my life is close to ideal.
2. The conditions of my life are excellent.
3. I am satisfied with my life.
4. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.
5. I have gotten the important things I want in life.
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Appendix E
Subjective Vitality Scale (Ryan & Frederick, 2007)
Note: Options below each statement were presented on a five-point numbered scale from
1 (inot at all true) to 5 (very true).
Please respond to the following items concerning how you feel today.
1. I feel alive and vital.
2. I don’t feel very energetic.
3. I feel so alive I just want to burst.
4. I have energy and spirit.
5. I am looking forward to each new day.
6. I feel alert and awake.
7. I feel energized.
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Appendix F
Self-Actualization Scale (Sheldon et al., 2001)
Note: Options below each statement were presented on a five-point numbered scale from
1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).
Please respond to the following items in terms o f how you feel today.
Today, I feel
1. that I am "becoming who I really am."
2. a sense o f deeper purpose in life.
3. a deeper understanding of m yself and my place in the universe.

